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Abstract
A distinct set of disadvantages experienced by black Americans increases their
likelihood of experiencing negative financial shocks, decreases their ability to mitigate
the impact of such shocks, and ultimately results in debt collection cases being far
more common in black neighborhoods than in non-black neighborhoods. In this
paper, we create a novel dataset that links debt collection court cases with infor-
mation from credit reports to document the disparity in debt collection judgments
across black and non-black neighborhoods and to explore potential mechanisms that
could be driving this judgment gap. We find that majority black neighborhoods
experience approximately 40% more judgments than non-black neighborhoods, even
after controlling for differences in median incomes, median credit scores, and default
rates. The racial disparity in judgments cannot be explained by differences in debt
characteristics across black and non-black neighborhoods, nor can it be explained by
differences in attorney representation, the share of contested judgments, or differences
in neighborhood lending institutions.
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1 Introduction
The distinct set of disadvantages experienced by black Americans increases their likelihood
of experiencing negative financial shocks and limits their ability to mitigate the impact
of such shocks. This ultimately makes them more likely to enter into default and have
unpaid balances sent to collections. If a collection is brought to court and a guilty verdict,
referred to as a judgment, is received, the defendant’s wages can be garnished or their bank
account can be seized. This fact, combined with compounding interest and various legal fees,
could ultimately hinder the debtor’s ability to accumulate wealth and overcome any initial
economic disadvantage.1
In this paper, we document a disparity in debt collection judgments across black and non-
black neighborhoods and explore potential mechanisms through which this racial disparity
could be entering the debt collection system.2 Such mechanisms include neighborhood level
differences in income and credit score distributions, differences in default rates, differences
in lending institutions, and the differences in debtors’ likelihood to contest the debt in court.
In order to document this disparity, we construct a novel zip code level panel dataset from
2004 to 2013 that links the number of debt collection judgments in each zip code in Mis-
souri to data from Experian credit reports and the American Community Survey. Our main
threat to identification is omitted variable bias. To mitigate this concern, we use a rich set
of control variables from the Experian credit report data to track all aspects of a neighbor-
hoods’ financial liabilities, including the types of debt incurred with the number of accounts
and balances, as well as the neighborhoods’ median credit score and detailed delinquency
information. Not only does this help mitigate omitted variable bias, but it provides insight
into the specific mechanisms that may or may not be driving the racial disparity in debt
1ADP, the nation’s largest payroll services provider, documented that more than one in 10 employees
between the ages of 35 to 44 had their wages garnished in 2013.
2This racial disparity was highlighted by Paul Keil and Anne Waldman in a Propulica article. They
documented a disproportionate number of judgments in predominantly black communities when compared
to white ones, with the risk of judgment being twice as high in majority black neighborhoods than in majority
white neighborhoods with similar income levels.
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collection judgments. We address concerns about differences in unobservable characteristics
across black and non-black neighborhood by limiting our sample to only neighborhoods with
common support over observables and controlling for county and year fixed effects.
We find that the judgment rate is 85% higher in majority black neighborhoods than in
majority non-black neighborhoods. Over half of this baseline judgment gap can be explained
by differences in incomes, credit scores, default rates, and housing values across black and
non-black neighborhoods; however, even after controlling for these differences, majority black
neighborhoods have approximately 40% more judgments than non-black neighborhoods. Dif-
ferences in total debt levels, debt composition, payment amounts, utilization ratios, and
delinquency rates do not further mitigate the judgment gap suggesting that credit scores are
accurately capturing the relevant information from consumers’ credit reports.
We also hypothesize that defendants from black neighborhoods could be less likely to hire
an attorney or to contest the debt in court, making it less costly for debt collectors to obtain
judgments in black neighborhoods. However, we show that there is no statistical difference
in the share of contested judgments across black and non-black communities and control-
ling for attorney representation has limited effect on the judgment gap. Another potential
theory regarding the racial gap in debt collection judgments is that differences in lending
institutions across black and non-black neighborhoods cause the positive correlation between
neighborhood racial composition and the judgment rate. However, the racial gap in judg-
ments remains after controlling for the number of banks and payday lenders in a given area.
Lastly, we explore the extent to which certain plaintiff types (e.g. major bank, debt collector,
high cost lender) are driving our results. Judgment rates are higher in black communities
for every plaintiff type, though, certain types of plaintiffs consistently show more racial im-
balance in their lawsuits than others. Our results are robust to an alternative measure of
credit score, alternative samples, and to using a gradient boosted trees machine learning
estimation strategy. Furthermore, these results can be replicated by using the estimated
racial composition of defendants as opposed to the racial composition of neighborhoods.
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There are two potential explanations that we cannot explore using our current data:
differences in wealth that are not driven by housing values and discrimination. Laws prohibit
using race to make decisions regarding access to credit, and thus many creditors do not collect
information on race. Furthermore, juries are not typically used in debt collection cases and,
if a case is heard in front of a judge, such cases are usually fairly algorithmic with a limited
amount of subjectivity involved. It is more likely that the unexplained racial gap in debt
collection judgments are the result of the broader disadvantages experienced by minority
communities that have persisted into our modern day society. For example, according to
estimates provided by the United States Census Bureau in 2016, the typical black household
has a net worth of $12,920, while that of a typical white household is $114,700 - this is
a $101,780 difference in wealth that could have important implications for a household’s
ability to mitigate negative financial shocks. About $35,000 of this wealth gap is not driven
by home equity. By translating this wealth gap into differences in annual income and using
our estimates of the relationship between income and judgements, we calculate that a wealth
gap of this size would explain almost all of the remaining judgment gap across black and
non-black communities.3
There is a large literature that documents the important role that race plays in the labor
market and the housing/mortgage markets (e.g. Bartlett et al. 2019, Ritter and Taylor 2011,
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004, and Turner et al. 2002). Blacks also face discrimination
in the legal and criminal justice system; for example, they are more likely to be searched
for contraband (Antonovics and Knight 2009), to have biased bail hearings (Arnold et al.
2018), and to be charged with a serious offense (Rehavi and Starr 2014). Furthermore, racial
3Our most conservative estimate of the judgment gap is 0.34 more judgments per 100 people in majority
black neighborhoods compared to majority non-black neighborhoods and is derived from Oster (2016). We
computed the difference in annual savings needed over a 40 year horizon to generate a wealth gap of $35,000.
We found that an annual difference of $2,910 is sufficient to generate the wealth gap in net present value.
For interest rate, we applied the historical return of the stock market, which between 1957 through 2018
is roughly 8%. Consistent with estimates from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, we assume an 8%
personal savings rate. This translates into an annual income difference of $36,375. Increasing the median
income of majority black neighborhoods by this amount would decrease the judgment rate by 0.25 judgments
per 100 people.
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differences in wealth are large and a growing literature explores how the racial wealth gap
was generated and persisted over time (e.g. McKernan et al. 2014 and Akbar et al. 2019).
While much attention has been given to racial disparities in general, this is the first economic
analysis to empirically document racial disparities in debt collection judgments.
Aside from the literature documenting racial disparities across many different dimensions,
this paper also contributes to a growing literature about the debt collection industry.4 We
know that consumers who are sued by creditors and debt collectors are drawn predominantly
from lower-income areas (Hynes, 2008). Other more recent studies have investigated the role
of information technology in the collection of consumer debts (Drozd and Serrano-Padial,
2017), documented the link between debt collection regulations and the supply of consumer
credit (Fedaseyeu, 2015), and determined if consumers are made better or worse off by
settling their debt outside of court (Cheng et al., 2019). Interpreted broadly, the impacts
of the debt collection process on consumer outcomes has been well documented; however,
racial disparities in debt collection have not been empirically explored.
The rest of our paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 discusses the typical debt collection
litigation process in the United States, as well as the laws regulating access to credit and
debt collection procedures, Section 3 describes our data, Section 4 outlines our empirical
strategy, Section 5 documents the racial gap in debt collection judgments and discussions
potential mechanisms driving the disparity, Section 6 presents various robustness checks,
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Background Information
The debt collection industry in the U.S. is large and the amount of debt being placed into
collection continues to grow. According to a 2018 annual report by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, debt collection is a $10.9 billion dollar industry that employs nearly
4See Hunt (2007) for an overview of the debt collection industry and details about its institutional
structure and regulatory environment.
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120,000 people across approximately 8,000 collection agencies in the United States. In 2010
alone, U.S. businesses placed $150 billion in debt with collection agencies. When the debt is
unsecured, the owner of the debt (i.e. the original creditor or the debt buyer) can either write
off the debt, negotiate with the debtor to bring their debt to current, or file a debt collection
lawsuit. In this section, we will summarize the key institutional details surrounding debt
collection lawsuits and the laws regulating the debt collection industry.
2.1 Debt Collection Litigation Process
Debt collection litigation typically begins when a creditor files a “Summons and Complaint”
in a state civil court.5 This document names the parties involved and states the amount
owed (including interest and, in some cases, attorney fees and court costs). The summons
is served to the defendant to notify them that they are being sued. It provides additional
information including the deadline for which the debtor must file a formal response, referred
to as the “answer”, to the court. If this deadline is not met, the creditor will usually ask the
court to enter a default judgment. Default judgments occur when the defendant has failed
to perform a court-ordered action, and results in the court settling the legal dispute in favor
of the plaintiff. The defendant is obligated to abide by the court’s ruling and is subject to
the punishments requested by the court.
For most routine debt collection lawsuits, if the debtor files a formal response to the
lawsuit a trial date will be requested and set by the court. In some courts, there will be
a settlement conference before the trial date to try to settle the case before trial. Once a
judgment is obtained by the creditor, the creditor might request a “debtor’s examination,”
which would require the debtor to appear in court and answer questions about their finances.
This process informs the creditor how it can collect the judgment. The most common
methods for enforcing the judgments are to garnish wages or bank accounts.6 If a dispute is
5These courts have many different names including municipal court, superior court, justice court, county
court, etc.
6Courts can also seize and sell the debtor’s personal property, though this is relatively uncommon.
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settled before trial, the creditor gives up the ability to collect on the debt by garnishing the
debtor’s bank accounts or wages, and therefore often requires a one time lump sum payment
to drop the suit.
2.2 Laws Regulating Debt Collection
Debtors are granted some protections throughout the debt collection process. The Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which was enacted in 1977, is the primary federal law
governing debt collection practices. The statute’s stated purposes are as follows: to eliminate
the abusive practices used to collect consumer debts such as calling the debtor at all hours
of the night and showing up to their place of employment; to promote fair debt collection;
and to provide consumers with an avenue for disputing and obtaining validation of debt
information in order to ensure the information’s accuracy.
Furthermore, the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) of 1968 restricts the amount
of earnings that creditors can garnish from defendants’ weekly disposable income to 25% or
the amount by which disposable earnings are greater than 30 times the minimum wage. The
share of wages protected from debt collection garnishments can be increased by state law.
For example, a creditor in Missouri can garnish only 10% of after-tax wages if the debtor is
the head of their household, though the burden to assert these protections is typically on the
debtor and take-up is relatively low. There is no federal law limiting the amount of savings
that can be seized from a debtor’s bank accounts.
While not directly related to debt collection, other protections have been put in place
to protect consumers in the credit market. For example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) enacted in 1974 makes it illegal for creditors to discriminate against any applicant
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or participation
in a public assistance program.7 The law applies to everyone who regularly participates in a
credit decision, including banks, retail and department stores, bankcard companies, finance
7This law is enforced by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the nation’s consumer protection agency.
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companies, and credit unions. The ECOA applies both to the decision to grant credit as
well as setting the terms of credit.
Furthermore, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 promotes the accuracy, fairness, and
privacy of consumer information contained in the files of consumer reporting agencies. It was
intended to protect consumers from the willful and/or negligent inclusion of inaccurate infor-
mation in their credit reports. More recently, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009 established fair and transparent credit card practices.
Key provisions include giving consumers enough time to pay their bills, prohibiting retroac-
tive rate increases, making it easier to pay down debt, eliminating “fee harvester cards”, and
eliminating excessive marketing to young people.
Despite these protections, abusive debt collection practices still exist and, as we will show,
minority neighborhoods are disproportionately impacted by debt collection judgments.
3 Data
We construct a zip code level panel dataset to document racial disparities in debt collection
lawsuits across black and non-black neighborhoods. This panel dataset is constructed by
combining multiple different data sources, the first of which documents debt collection court
cases filed in Missouri from 2004 to 2013.8 For each zip code in our sample, we know the
number of debt collection lawsuits filed and the number of judgments arising from these
lawsuits. We also know the number of cases that resulted in a default judgment (meaning
the debtor did not show up to court), a consent judgment (meaning the debtor showed up to
court and admitted to owing the debt), and the number of cases that were contested (meaning
that some aspect of the debt was disputed). We know if the defendant was represented by
an attorney and the plaintiff type (categorized into the following groups: auto, debt buyer,
8This data was generously provided by Kiel and Waldman (2015). They acquired individual court case
data from the state court administration. Their white paper focuses on three jurisdictions: Cook County,
Illinois (composed of Chicago and surrounding suburbs), St. Louis City and St. Louis County, Missouri,
and Essex county, New Jersey (composed of Newark and suburbs). The data included basic case information
such as the plaintiff, the defendant, and the defendant’s address. The race of the defendant is not reported.
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high-cost lender, major bank, medical, utility, and miscellaneous).
We also use Experian credit report data to control for credit scores, default rates, and
other debt characteristics. This is an anonymous quarterly longitudinal panel of individuals
who have an Experian credit report and spans from 2004 to 2013. The data contains many
variables which allows us to track all aspects of individuals financial liabilities, detailed
delinquencies, various types of debt with the number of accounts and balances, as well as an
individual’s credit score. The data also contains each individual’s zip code. We calculate the
median credit score, the average number of delinquent accounts, and other credit measures
for each zip code in our sample. We supplement these data with zip code tabulation data
from the 2009-2013 American Community Survey to control for racial composition, median
household income, the unemployment rate, and other socioeconomic variables of interest at
the zip code level.9
We also document the number of lending institutions that are accessible to each neigh-
borhood as an additional proxy for a neighborhood’s financial well-being.10 We use Census
ZIP Code Business Patterns (ZCBP) data to get access to the number of banks and payday
lenders in each zip code. The ZCBP data measure the number of establishments, number
of employees and total payroll by ZIP and detailed industry code. Following Butta (2014)
we use the following two North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes
to capture payday lending establishments: non-depository consumer lending (establishments
primarily engaged in making unsecured cash loans to consumers) and other activities related
to credit intermediation (establishments primarily engaged in facilitating credit intermedi-
ation, including check cashing services and money order issuance services).11 For each zip
code, we use arcGIS to create a weighted average (based on land area) of the number of banks
9All dollar values are adjusted to be in terms of 2013 dollars. USPS ZIP Codes are not areal features used
by the Census but a collection of mail delivery routes that identify the individual post office or metropolitan
area delivery station associated with mailing addresses. ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) are generalized
areal representations of United States Postal Service (USPS) ZIP Code service areas.
10This measure can alternatively be thought of as a measure of access to credit markets. However, payday
lenders could be the result of financial distress as opposed to the cause.
11Barth et al. (2016) discuss how this proxy could likely overstate the number of payday lenders. We
adjust these measures to correct for states that prohibit payday lending to help reduce this bias.
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and payday lenders that exist within a five mile radius from each zip code’s centroid. Lastly,
we use Fixed Broadband Deployment Data from Federal Communications Commission to
document access to online credit markets for every zip code in our sample.
3.1 Race Proxies
In this paper, our primary focus is differences in the number of judgments per 100 people
across majority black and majority non-black neighborhoods.12 As such, we use neighbor-
hood racial composition as our primary independent variable and classify a zip code as a
majority black zip code if more than 50% of its residents are black. Information on the racial
and ethnic composition of the U.S. population by geography comes from the Summary File
1 (SF1) from the 2010 Census, which provides counts of enumerated individuals by race
and ethnicity for various geographic area definitions, including zip code tabulation areas.13
However, one may wonder about the racial composition of the defendant pool specifically.
In this section, we discuss various methods used by statisticians to estimate race when it is
not available in administrative data. These methods generally use publicly available demo-
graphic information associated with an individual’s surname and place of residence from the
U.S. Census Bureau to construct proxies for race.
Our first proxy uses only surnames to predict the race of an individual, and thus the racial
composition of the defendant pool. Information used to calculate the probability of belonging
to a specific race given an individual’s surname is based on data from the 2010 Census.
This dataset provides each surname held by at least 100 enumerated individuals, along
with a breakdown of the percentage of individuals with that name belonging to one of six
race and ethnicity categories: Hispanic; non-Hispanic White; non-Hispanic Black or African
American; non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islander; non-Hispanic American Indian and Alaska
12The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) generally prohibits a creditor from inquiring about the
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex of an applicant, and as a result we lack information about race in
both the Experian and debt collection datasets. One exception is applications for home mortgages covered
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
13Census block are the highest level of disaggregation (the smallest geography).
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Native; and non-Hispanic Multiracial. In total, the surname list provides information on the
162,253 surnames covering approximately 90% of the population. While this proxy works
well for Hispanic and Asian names, it is less accurate at predicting black-white differences
since blacks and whites tend to have more similar surnames. We classify a defendant pool
as being majority black if at least 50% of the defendants in the debt collection data were
predicted to be black.
Our second proxy for the racial composition of defendants is constructed using Bayesian
Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) (Elliott et al. 2009).14 This method combines
geography- and surname-based information into a single proxy probability for race using
the Bayes updating rule. This method involves constructing a probability of assignment
to race based on demographic information associated with surname and then updating this
probability using the demographic characteristics of the zip code associated with place of
residence. The updating is performed through the application of a Bayesian algorithm, which
yields an integrated probability that can be used to proxy for an individuals race and ethnic-
ity.15 We once again classify the defendant pool as being majority black if at least 50% of the
defendants in the debt collection data were predicted to be black. Research has found that
this approach produces proxies that correlate highly with self-reported race and national
origin and is more accurate than relying only on demographic information associated with
a borrowers last name or place of residence alone (CFBP Report, 2014).
3.2 Sample Selection
Our main specifications focus only on debt collection cases from Missouri. Aside from the
fact that Missouri has a centralized database of cases tried in different circuit courts, pre-
vious research has documented that Missouri is a representative state in terms of collection
(Ratcliffe et al., 2014 and Cheng et al., 2019). More specifically, Missouri is representative in
14Consumer Finance Protection Bureaus Office of Research (OR), the Division of Supervision, Enforce-
ment, and Fair Lending (SEFL) rely on a Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding (BISG) proxy method.
15Details of this algorithm are discussed in Section A2 of the Appendix.
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terms of percentage of consumers who are delinquent and the average amount of debt in col-
lections (Ratcliffe et al., 2014). Missouri is also not particularly exceptional with regards to
the law surrounding collections, its share of black residents, or its level of inequality (Cheng
et al., 2019). Finally, debt collectors in Missouri are obligated to file cases in the court as-
sociated with the borrowers address and their centralized database provides the defendants
surname, both of which assists in our calculation of racial proxies of the defendant pool.
We have two additional sources of debt collection judgment data. The first is from all
counties from New Jersey and Cook County, Illinois (composed of Chicago and surrounding
suburbs). However, it is less detailed than the Missouri data. This data includes the number
of cases filed in a five-year window from 2008-2012, but we don’t have breakdowns about the
type of judgment (default, consent, contested), we don’t know the defendants’ names, and we
don’t know if they were represented by an attorney. Our second additional source of judgment
data comes from the Experian Credit Report data. This data once again lacks breakdowns
by judgment and plaintiff type, as well as information about attorney representation. All of
our main specifications use data from Missouri due to its representative nature, the high level
of detail in the data, and because we want to keep our sample consistent across specifications.
However, when comparable information is available, we use these additional data sources to
test the robustness of our results.
4 Empirical Strategy
There are important differences in observable characteristics across majority black and non-
majority black neighborhoods, which is documented in Figure 1. This figure shows kernel
density estimates of various covariates that are used throughout this analysis. High share
black neighborhoods tend to have lower median credit scores, lower median household in-
comes, lower median house values, higher unemployment rates and a higher share of divorced
individuals. These disparities cause concern that there could also be important differences
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in unobservable characteristics that vary with racial composition of neighborhoods. We mit-
igate this concern by limiting our sample to only neighborhoods with common support over
observables (Crump et al. 2009).
Specifically, we use a logistic regression to restrict our dataset to a common support. We
estimate:
Φ(Mict) = β0 + θXic + ic (1)
where Mict is an indicator variable equal to one if neighborhood i in county c in year t is
predicted to be a majority black and Xict is a vector of other controls for neighborhood i
in county c in year t which includes quintiles of the income and credit score distributions,
median income, median credit score, the gini index of income inequality, 90+ days-past-due
debt balances, unemployment and divorce rates, population density, median house value, and
education attainment levels such as fraction with at least a bachelors degree and fraction
with less than a high school diploma. We plot the propensity score distribution in Figure A1,
and restrict our sample to the intersection of the two curves. This drops very high income
non-black neighborhoods and very low income black neighborhoods from our sample.
To further limit omitted variable bias, we use a rich set of control variables combined with
both county and year fixed effects. County fixed effects will control for any time invariant
unobservable characteristics of counties and year fixed effects control for any time varying
changes that impact all of our neighborhoods.
4.1 Summary Statistics
Our common support sample consists of over 250 zip codes observed over 10 years. Table
1 presents summary statistics for our variables of interest across both majority black and
majority non-black zip codes. Panel A shows our judgment data. On average, majority black
neighborhoods had higher judgment rates than non-black neighborhoods (2.7 judgments per
100 people as opposed to 1.4). Black neighborhoods had a higher share of cases result in
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default judgments and a lower share of cases in which the defendant was represented by an
attorney. Panel B summarizes differences in credit characteristics and lending institutions
across black and non-black neighborhoods. On average, majority black neighborhoods have
lower median credit scores and more debt balances that are 90 days past due. Lastly, Panel
C summarizes other baseline control variables, including median income, median housing
values, and educational attainment variables. In general, black neighborhoods have lower
median household incomes, lower median house values, higher unemployment rates, and a
lower share of college educated individuals. Most of these differences are significant at the
1% level.
4.2 Empirical Specification
We use a fixed effect framework with our common support sample to estimate the impact
of racial composition on the debt collection judgment rate of neighborhoods. Our empirical
specification is given by the following equation:
yict = α + βMic + θXict + γc + λt + ict (2)
where yict is the number of judgments per every 100 people in neighborhood i in county c in
year t , Mict is an indicator variable equal to one if neighborhood i in county c in year t has a
black population greater than 50%, and Xict is a vector of other controls for neighborhood i
in county c in year t. Our main specification also includes county fixed effects to control for
any time invariant differences across counties and year fixed effects to control for any time
varying changes that impact all of our neighborhoods (like the Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009). All regressions are weighted by population and
standard errors are clustered at the county level.
To limit omitted variable bias and to better understand the mechanisms driving the
racial disparity in debt collection judgments, we include a vast set of control variables.
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Aside from income and credit score, we add measures of debt balances by type of debt
(credit card, medical, student loans, etc.), debt composition (type of debt as share of total
debt balances), delinquent balances by length of delinquency (30 days, 60 days, 90 days),
and bankruptcy/collection flags to Xict. We also add controls for the number of banks and
payday lenders within a five mile radius of each zip code and explore the results by plaintiff
and judgment type.
5 Results
To establish a baseline judgment gap, we begin by documenting the racial disparity in
judgments across black and non-black neighborhoods controlling only for county and year
fixed effects. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the judgment rate and the percentage
of blacks in a zip code. This figure classifies zip codes into one of a hundred bins based on
their share of black residents and plots the average share of black of each bin against the
average judgment rate of each bin. The size of the bubbles corresponds to the number of zip
codes in each of the bins; as expected, there are many low share black neighborhoods and
relatively less high share black observations. The regression line represents the fit between
the average judgment rate in the bin and the share of black population weighted by the
number of observations in the bin. We see that the judgment rate is positively correlated
with the share of black residents residing in the zip code.
This relationship is formalized in Column (1) of Table 2. Column (1) shows that majority
black neighborhoods have about 1.2 more judgments per every 100 people compared to non-
black neighborhoods; this implies that the judgment rate in black neighborhoods is almost
double that of non-black neighborhoods where the average judgment rate is 1.4 judgments
per 100 people.
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5.1 Income and Credit Score Distributions
One important difference in the observable characteristics between black and non-black
neighborhoods is differences in income. Panel (a) of Figure 3 plots neighborhoods by their
median income and the judgment rate per 100 people, with darker red circles representing
neighborhoods with a higher share of black residents and darker blue circles representing
neighborhoods with a higher share of white residents. This figure documents a negative rela-
tionship between the judgment rate and median income, with the judgment rate decreasing
as median income increases. However, even looking at neighborhoods with similar income
levels, we see higher judgment rates for majority black neighborhoods.
Column (2) of Table 2 adds controls for income quintiles and median income to the
previous specification. After controlling for differences in the income distribution across
black and non-black neighborhoods, we see that black neighborhoods are associated with
0.9 more judgments per 100 people. This implies that differences in the income distribution
across black and non-black neighborhoods can explain 23% if the racial disparity in debt
collection.
A second important difference in the observable characteristics between black and non-
black neighborhoods is differences in credit scores. Panel (b) of Figure 3 plots neighborhoods
by their median credit score and the judgment rate per 100 people, with darker red circles
once again representing neighborhoods with a higher share of black residents and darker blue
circles representing neighborhoods with a higher share of white residents. This figure doc-
uments a negative relationship between the judgment rate and median credit scores. Once
again, racial bias is evident in this figure, with majority black neighborhood having higher
judgment rates than non-black neighborhoods with similar median credit scores, suggest-
ing that differences in credit scores may not be the primary mechanism driving the racial
disparity in debt collection cases.
Column (3) in Table 2 adds credit score quintiles and median credit score to the baseline
specification. We see that majority black zip codes are associated with 0.75 more judgments
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per 100 individuals, a 50% increase of the average judgment rate of non-black zip codes.
This means that differences in the credit score distribution can explain 40% of the judgment
gap between black and non-black neighborhoods. Column (4) adds income and credit score
controls into the same specification and coefficient changes very little, suggesting that 60%
of the judgment gap remains unexplained after controlling for differences in the income and
credit score distributions across black and non-black communities.
Column (5) adds controls for total delinquent debt balances, unemployment rate, median
house value, the fraction of the population with a college education, and population density.16
In this specification, we see that majority black neighborhoods have a 40% higher judgment
rate than non-black neighborhoods. It is primarily the inclusion of the unemployment rate
and median housing values that cause the decline in the estimated coefficient on our majority
black indicator. This suggests that these variables can explain away an additional 10% of
the baseline judgment disparity. Column (6) uses a one year lag of our baseline controls.
Even after adding controls for these observable characteristics, 50% of the baseline judgment
disparity still remains.
5.2 Debt Characteristics
We also explore whether differences in debt portfolios of black and non-black neighborhoods
are driving the racial disparity in debt collection judgments independent of credit score. For
example, it could be the case that majority black neighborhoods tend to acquire the type
of debt that is more likely to be collected in court. To explore this hypothesis, we use the
plethora of information from the Experian Credit Report data to control for differences in
debt characteristics across black and non-black communities. Such controls include total
debt levels, debt composition, payment amounts, utilization ratios, and delinquency rates.
16According to estimates provided by the United States Census Bureau in 2016, the typical black house-
hold has a net worth of $12,920, while that of a typical white household is $114,700. This difference could
play an important role in driving the racial gap in debt collection. Since a majority of wealth accumulated
to middle or low income households is through home ownership, we use housing values to help control for
differences in wealth levels across black and non-black neighborhood.
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Our results are presented in Table 3. Each specification includes the income, credit scores,
and baseline controls discussed in Table 2, as well as county and year fixed effects. Column
(1) adds additional controls for total debt levels, including breakdowns for the type of debt
such as credit card debt, mortgage debt, and student loan debt. Column (2) includes controls
for payment amounts and utilization rates. Column (3) includes debt composition controls,
such as credit card debt as a share of total debt. Column (4) adds additional delinquency
and collection controls, including the total debt balances that are 30 days, 60 days, or 90
days delinquent, as well as bankruptcy and collection flags. Lastly, Column (5) includes all
of these controls together. In each specification we see that majority black neighborhoods
have an additional 0.6 judgments per 100 individuals, a 40% higher judgment rate compared
to non-black neighborhoods. These results indicate that after controlling for differences in
credit scores, differences in debt characteristics cannot explain any additional share of the
racial disparity in judgment rates.
5.3 Lending Institutions
We have shown that a racial disparity in debt collection judgments exists, even after control-
ling for differences in the income and credit score distributions across black and non-black
neighborhoods. In this section, we explore another potential mechanism that could be driv-
ing the racial disparity in debt collection judgments - differences in lending institutions across
black and non-black neighborhoods.17
To explore this potential explanation, we use arcGIS to create an index that measures
the number of banks and payday lenders within 5 and 10 mile radii from each zip codes’
centroid.18 We also use broadband access as a proxy for access to online credit markets and
the share of credit reports that are unscored as proxy for access to credit.19 We add these
17The presence of payday lenders is likely the result of financial distress as opposed to the cause. As such,
we view these controls as an additional measure of the financial well-being of neighborhoods as opposed to
a measure of credit access.
18This analysis only used data from 2008-2012 and thus our sample size is slightly smaller. We replicate
the main results on this subsample of the data for context.
19An unscored credit report is one in which there is not enough information on a consumers credit report
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variables as controls to our main specification.
The results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) shows our main result is present on
this subsample of data. In Columns (2) and (3), we add controls for broadband access and
the share of unscored accounts in a zip code respectively; both measures have no impact on
our coefficient of interest. In Columns (4) and (5) we add our controls for banks and payday
lenders with 5 and 10 mile radii. We see that the number of banks is negatively correlated
with the judgment rate while the number of payday lenders is positively correlated with the
number of judgments. Adding these controls decreases the coefficient on black majority by
15%, though, a large racial gap in the number of judgments issued across black and non-black
communities remains.
5.4 Attorney Representation and Judgment Type
We next investigate whether debt collectors target neighborhoods where defendants are less
likely to have an attorney or to contest the debt. It could be the case that debt collectors
target their collection efforts in areas where defendants are less likely to show up to court,
resulting in a default judgment, or in areas where defendants tend to acknowledge they owe
the debt. In other words, debt collectors might avoid collecting in areas where defendants
tend to argue some aspect of the debt owed, which could result in the plaintiff exerting more
effort or spending money to collect the debt.
To explore the extent to which differences in attorney representation are driving our
result, we document the disparity in attorney representation and show how this disparity
impacts the judgment rate. These results are presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Table
5. Note that each specification in this table includes the income, credit score, and baseline
controls discussed in Table 2, as well as county and year fixed effects. The outcome variable
in Column (1) is the share of debt collection court cases where the defendant was represented
by an attorney; this result shows that defendants in majority black neighborhoods are less
to issue a formal credit score. This could serve as an access to credit if unscored reports are correlated with
limited access to credit markets as opposed to a limited desire to obtain credit.
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likely to have an attorney represent them in a debt collection court case. However, as seen in
Column (2) where our dependent variable is once again judgments per 100 people, controlling
for the share of cases in which defendants are represented by an attorney cannot explain the
racial disparity in debt collection cases.
We take this as evidence that attorney representation does not impact the number of debt
collection judgments; this does not imply that attorney representation is not meaningful or
important in debt collection court cases. Debt collection laws often place the burden to assert
various legal protections, including the share of the debtor’s wages that can be garnished
as the result of a judgment, on the debtor. Attorney representation is likely important in
protecting debtors’ rights throughout the debt collection process, even if such cases ultimately
end in judgments.
To explore the extent to which differences in the share of contested versus uncontested
cases could be driving our result, we document the impact of neighborhood racial composition
on the share of different types of judgments.20 Our outcome variable in Column (3) is the
share of cases in which the defendant admitted to owing the debt, our outcome variable in
Column (4) is the share of cases that were contested, and our outcome variable in Column
(5) is the share of cases resulting in default judgments. We see no racial differences along
these dimensions. These results suggest that it is unlikely that debt collectors are targeting
areas without attorney representation or areas where defendants are less likely to show up
to court.
20We also document the share of cases that resulted in a judgment. These results are presented in Table
A1 in the Appendix. While only marginally significant, we see that majority black neighborhoods are 2
percentage points more likely to have a case result in a judgment. This is primarily driven by a lower share
of cases being settled before a case is tried. This translates to a 10% decrease from the non-black settlement
rate. Since settling a case often requires a one time lump sum payment, defendants who settle tend to
have worse subsequent credit outcomes (Cheng et al. 2019). This suggests that a lower propensity to settle
cases before trial could actually help defendants from majority black neighborhoods. This can also be seen
as suggestive evidence that defendants from majority non-black neighborhoods are better able to mitigate
negative shocks. We see no statistical difference in the share of cases that are dismissed.
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5.5 Non-linearities & Higher Order Interactions
In this section, we investigate if machine learning techniques that allow for high order in-
teractions of observable characteristics can help inform what mechanisms are driving the
remaining racial disparity in judgments. More specifically, we implement Gradient Boosted
Trees (GBT) which is an ensemble learning method that recursively combines the forecasts
of many shallow decision trees.21 The theory behind boosting is that a collection of weak
learners as a whole creates a single strong learner with improved stability over a single com-
plex tree. There are pros and cons to using machine learning approaches to explore the
racial disparity in debt collection. Two of the key benefits of applying GBT is that it is
particularly well suited to capturing interactions between variables in the data, without ex-
ante specifying what interactions to add and that it increases our predictive power.22 The
downside of this technique is that interpretability becomes more difficult and less precise.
5.5.1 Explanatory Power of Variables
We use SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP), a unified framework for interpreting asso-
ciations, to explain the output of our Gradient Boosted Trees (Nonlinear Model).23 SHAP
uses a game theoretical concept to assign each feature a local importance value for a given
prediction. The SHAP value gives us individualized impacts for each predictor; positive
SHAP values are associated with increased judgment rates and negative SHAP values are
associated with decreased judgment rates. Figure 4 plots the distribution of the impact each
predictor, including first order interactions, has on the model output for the fifteen most
important predictors. These distributions are shaded based on the value of the independent
variable with blue dots representing lower values and red dots representing higher values.
21For more information about the GBT model, see Friedman [2001] and the Appendix.
22Table A12 contrasts the predictive power of the GBT model with the linear model. The RMSE is
computed using a regression of baseline covariates on judgment rates, and the results show that the nonlinear
model is better able to explain the variation in judgment rates. Note RMSE =
√
1− r2 ∗ σy, and hence, a
lower RMSE translates into higher predictive power.
23For more on SHAP, see Lundberg and Lee [2017].
20
This figure orders our independent variables in order of their importance as a predictor of
judgments in the GBT procedure. Neigbhorhood racial composition is the most important
predictor of judgment rates. Thus, allowing for a nonlinear model with higher order in-
teractions does not mitigate the impact of neighborhood racial composition on judgment
rates; if anything, allowing for this more flexible model highlights the importance of race in
predicting judgments.
Aside from neighborhood racial composition, high median house value and credit score
decrease predicted judgment rate. The divorce rate is also a significant predictor; neighbor-
hoods with higher divorce rates are associated with higher judgment rates and neighborhoods
with lower divorce rates are associated with lower judgment rates. These results only point
to correlations between the predictors and the judgment rate; they should not be interpreted
causally. They are primarily used to understand the contribution each predictor on the final
model output and to provide some comparative statics.
5.6 Differences in Plaintiff Type
Lastly, we explore if differences in judgment rates across black and non-black zip codes are
driven by a specific plaintiff category. For each zip code, we know the number of judgments
awarded to each of the following plaintiff types: auto, debt buyer, high-cost lender, major
bank, medical, utility, and miscellaneous. Debt buyers account for 48% of plaintiffs in our
sample. Medical lenders, major banks, and high-cost lenders are the next largest plaintiff
categories accounting for 20%, 13%, and 6% of plaintiffs respectively. The other plaintiff
categories are combined into the miscellaneous category.
Our results are presented in Table 6. Each specification includes the income, credit score,
and baseline controls discussed in Table 2, as well as county and year fixed effects. Column
(1) repeats the main analysis and includes judgments from all plaintiff types (this is the
same result presented in Column (5) of Table 2). Column (2) limits the outcome variable to
only judgments obtained by debt buyers, Column (3) to major banks, Column (4) to medical
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companies, Column (5) to high cost lenders, and Column (6) to any other lender. The racial
gap in judgments is persistent across all plaintiff types.
The coefficients estimated across each specifications should not be directly compared
due to differences in the baseline judgment rates in non-black neighborhoods across these
different plaintiff types. For example, the judgment rate in non-black neighborhoods was
0.58 judgments per 100 people for debt buyers, 0.46 judgments per 100 people for major
banks, and 0.08 judgments per 100 people for high cost lenders. These baseline levels imply
that majority black neighborhoods have a 33% higher judgment rate than non-black neigh-
borhoods among debt buyers, a 9% higher judgment rate among major banks and a 128%
higher judgment rate among high cost lenders. Thus, while the racial gap in debt collection
judgments exists for every plaintiff type, high cost lenders consistently showed more of a
racial imbalance in their lawsuits than others.
6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we provide various robustness checks including different measures of racial
composition and exploring the impact of the racial composition of the defendant pool as
opposed to the racial composition of the neighborhood. We also explore selection on unob-
servables, an alternative measure of credit score, and alternative judgment data sources.
6.1 Race Proxies
In this section we show that our results are robust to using the share of black residents in
a neighborhood as opposed to a binary measure. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 present
this result. Column (1) shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the share
of black residents within a zip code and Column (2) shows our preferred specification from
Table (2) which uses our binary measure for a black neighborhood. One potential concern
with this analysis is that the racial composition of defendants within a neighborhood could
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be drastically different from the racial composition of the neighborhood itself. As such, we
use our BISG measure of share black to estimate the racial composition of the defendant
pool. Columns (3)-(4) present the results. Once again, the results are all positive and
statistically significant. Column (5) uses only surname (and no information on zip code
demographics) to predict the racial composition of defendants. The result is positive and
statistically significant, although the effect size increases drastically.
Columns (6)-(7) of Table 7 present our results when the BISG method was used to
estimate race but uses zip code fixed effects instead of county fixed effects. This is only
possible with our proxies that utilize variation in defendants name because only these proxies
give us variation in the racial composition of defendants over time. We once again get a
positive and statistically significant coefficient, with black neighborhoods experiencing 0.6
more judgments per 100 people than comparable non-black neighborhoods. This is a 40%
increase over the non-black neighborhood mean of 1.4 judgments per every 100 people.
6.1.1 Other Races
One might wonder if this phenomenon is specific to the black population. In Table 8, we repli-
cate Table 2 with additional controls for the share of Hispanic and Asian population within
each zip code. While columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show judgment gaps for both Asians and
Hispanic neighborhoods (with share Asian being negatively related to judgments and share
Hispanic being positively related to judgments), these disparities are completely explained
away by differences in credit scores, income, and our other baseline controls; Columns (5)
and (6) show no statistically significant coefficients for the share of Hispanic and Asian pop-
ulations. The share of black residents remains positive and statistically significant in each
of the specifications. These results indicate that there is something specific about black
neighborhoods that is causing the gap in judgments.
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6.2 Selection on Unobservables
We also investigated the impact of selection on unobservables on coefficient stability (Oster
[2019]). In particular, we used Column (5) of Table 2 as our benchmark, and found that
given a selection on unobservables that is half of the size of the selection on observables, our
coefficient on black majority is reduced to 0.34 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from
[0.13 to 0.54].24 This suggests that 24% of our baseline judgment gap of 1.4 would remain
after controlling for unobservable characteristics.25 This finding suggests that a racial gap is
unlikely to be zero, even after controlling for any unobservable characteristics.
6.3 Alternative Credit Score
In Table A2 in the Appendix, we add an alternative control for credit score, that was
calculated using a deep learning algorithm. The model was shown to consistently outperform
standard credit scoring models when predicting default rates (Albanesi and Vamossy [2019]).
This alternative credit score has more predictive power then credit score in predicting default.
However, it does not mitigate the racial bias we see in judgments across black and non-
black communities. This provides additional support that differences in credit scores, which
measure a borrowers likelihood of defaulting, is not the main factor driving the judgment
gap between black and non-black communities.
6.4 Evolution of Disparity
Figure 5 plots the evolution of the racial disparity from 2004-2013. The racial disparity is
present over our whole sample period, however it increases dramatically during the great
recession. This could be taken as evidence that minority neighborhoods were disproportion-
24We bootstrapped our treatment coefficient estimates 100 times, and assumed a maximum R2 value of
0.9.
25We also examined the proportion of selection of unobservables to observables that would explain away
our treatment effect. We found that a ratio of 1.08 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from [0.56, 1.6]
is sufficient to explain away our findings.
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ately impacted by recession or that they had less wealth to help mitigate the negative shocks
associated with the recession.
6.5 Alternative Data Sources
NJ and IL Data. Tables 1 and 2 are replicated using data from New Jersey and Cook
County, Illinois. The results are presented in Table A3 and A4 in the appendix. Table A3
shows that judgments per 100 people are larger in majority black neighborhoods compared
to majority non-black neighborhoods, while median income and median credit score tend
to be lower. Table A4 confirms that the racial gap in debt collection judgments cannot
be explained by differences in median income or median credit score. These results suggest
that judgments are 30% higher in majority black neighborhoods compared to majority white
ones. Differences in other observable characteristics, such as default rates, can explain some
of this disparity, although even after controlling for these differences, judgments are still 22%
higher in black neighborhoods compared to non-black neighborhoods.
Individual Data. Tables 1, 2, and 3 are replicated using merged Experian-ACS data. All
of the credit variables, including judgments, are individual specific. Racial composition and
other control variables from the census are imputed by zip code. The results are presented in
Table A5, Table A6, and Table A7 in the appendix. About 75% of the racial disparity can be
explained by differences in income and debt portfolios; being from a black neighborhood is
associated with 0.02 more judgments, a 22% increase over the baseline rate of 0.07 judgments
per 100 people.26
26Only 24% of the baseline judgment gap of 0.069 remains after the inclusion of income and credit controls.
This is the same share of the judgment gap that remains unexplained from the Oster test presented above.
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7 Conclusion
Our estimates suggests that there are 40% more debt collection judgments in majority black
neighborhoods compared to non-black neighborhoods even after controlling for differences
in incomes and credit scores. This racial disparity exists for different racial measures and
cannot be fully explained away by the share of contested versus uncontested cases across
black and non-black communities or by differences in debt characteristics. The racial gap
in debt collection judgments cannot be explained by differences in lending institutions and
exists for every plaintiff type, however, certain types of plaintiffs consistently showed more
of a racial imbalance in their lawsuits than others.
There are two potential explanations that we cannot explore using our current data:
differences in wealth and discrimination. It is unclear where discrimination would occur
during the legal process, as most cases are fairly algorithmic and heard by a judge with no jury
necessary. Furthermore, Keil and Waldman (2015) quote Lance LeCombs, the Metropolitan
St. Louis Sewer District’s spokesman, who claims his company has no demographic data
on its customers and treated them all the same. The racial disparity in its suits, he said,
is the result of “broader ills in our community that are outside of our scope and exceed
our abilities and authority to do anything about.” According to estimates provided by the
United States Census Bureau in 2016, one such broader ill is that the typical black household
has a net worth of $12,920, while that of a typical white household is $114,700 - this is a
$101,780 difference in wealth that could have important implications for a household’s ability
to mitigate negative income shocks. About 35,000 of this wealth gap is not driven by home
equity. By translating this wealth gap into a difference in annual income and using our
estimates of the relationship between income and judgements, we calculate that a wealth
gap of this size would explain almost all of our most conservative estimate of the judgment
gap across black and non-black communities.27
27Our most conservative estimate of the judgment gap is 0.34 more judgments per 100 people in majority
black neighborhoods compared to majority white ones and is derived from Oster (2016). We computed the
difference in annual savings needed over a 40 year horizon to generate a wealth gap of $35,000. We found
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As the number of debt collection cases rise, identifying both the extent to which racial
disparities exist and how they are entering the debt collection system are crucial. Future
research should explore policies meant to provide more protections to consumers and how
they impact the racial disparity in debt collection judgments. Such reforms could require
debt buying companies to prove they own the debt before they can sue a debtor, preventing
companies from winning judgments when the statute of limitations has expired on a debt28,
or require collection attorneys to prove they have a legal right to collect attorney fees and
provide an itemized list of their work on the case in order to win an attorneys fee through a
default judgment29. When states do provide legal protections for debtors, such as allowing
those with children to keep more of their pay under a head of family exemption, the burden
is typically on the debtor to assert these protections. Another policy reform could require a
clear notice that these are provided to debtors.
that an annual difference of $2,910 is sufficient to generate the wealth gap in net present value. For interest
rate, we applied the historical return of the stock market, which between 1957 through 2018 is roughly 8%.
Consistent with estimates from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, we assume an 8% personal savings
rate. This translates into an annual income difference of $36,375. Increasing the median income of majority
black neighborhoods by this amount would decrease the judgment rate by 0.25 judgments per 100 people.
28In most states, the law currently requires defendants to know that the statute of limitations has expired,
and raise it as a defense in court.
29Currently, when companies sue, they often request such fees, which are usually granted and passed on
to the debtor as part of the judgment. For example, in Missouri, the fees are usually set at 15 percent of the
debt owed, even though attorneys may spend only a few minutes on a suit.
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of Selected Covariates
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Figure 2: Judgments and Demographic Composition
Notes: Linear regression illustrates the relationship between share of black population and judgment rate.
We categorized zip codes into one of a hundred bins based on their share of black residents and plotted the
average share black of each bin against the average judgment rate of each bin. The size of the bubbles
corresponds to the number of observations in each of the bins. The regression line represents the fit
between the average judgment rate in the bin and the share of black population weighted by the number of
observations in the bin.
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(a) Median Income and Judgment Rate
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(b) Median Credit Score and Judgment Rate
Figure 3: Income, Credit Scores, and Judgment Rate
Notes: The green line represents the non-parametric locally weighted regression line (LOESS) showing the
smoothed fit curve of the data. Income is winsorized at the 98% level to mitigate the impact of outliers.
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Figure 4: GBT Feature Explanations
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Figure 5: Disparity over Time
Notes: We estimate the disparity in judgments by year.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Black White t-test
Panel A: Judgments
...Judgments per 100 People 2.73 1.43 -1.30∗∗∗
(1.31) (0.91)
...Share of Default Judgments 0.45 0.38 -0.06∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.12)
...Share of Consent Judgments 0.16 0.16 0.01
(0.07) (0.10)
...Share of Contested Judgments 0.06 0.05 -0.01∗
(0.04) (0.06)
...Share w/ Attorney 0.04 0.10 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.07)
Panel B : Credit Variables
..Median Credit Score 606.21 647.30 41.09∗∗∗
(38.55) (49.16)
...90+ DPD Debt Balances 3347.35 2336.32 -1011.03∗∗∗
(2690.36) (5619.73)
...Banks (5 miles) 86.22 23.24 -62.99∗∗∗
(40.75) (42.50)
...Payday Lenders (5 miles) 30.49 7.29 -23.20∗∗∗
(9.51) (11.51)
Panel C: Census Data
...Median Household Income (000s) 32.07 42.86 10.79∗∗∗
(12.04) (12.07)
...GINI Index 0.46 0.42 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)
...Unemployment Rate 0.11 0.07 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
...Divorce Rate 0.13 0.12 -0.01∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
...Median House Value (000s) 88.95 105.82 16.87∗∗∗
(35.83) (41.42)
...Fraction with Bachelors Degree 0.17 0.19 0.02∗
(0.10) (0.12)
...Fraction without High School Degree 0.19 0.15 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
Observations 227 2446 2673
Notes: Summary statistics for observations on the common support sample. Data
is drawn from Missouri. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
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Table 2: Judgments, Income, and Credit Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black Majority: ZIP 1.2091∗∗∗ 0.9204∗∗∗ 0.7503∗∗∗ 0.7262∗∗∗ 0.5819∗∗∗ 0.6454∗∗∗
(0.0437) (0.0888) (0.0857) (0.0682) (0.1175) (0.0552)
Median Household Income 0.0006 0.0137 0.0174
(0.0294) (0.0180) (0.0181)
Median Credit Score -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0085∗ -0.0057
(0.0035) (0.0044) (0.0034)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Baseline Controls X
Income Quintiles X X X
Credit Quintiles X X X
Lagged Baseline Controls X
Observations 2673 2673 2673 2673 2673 2407
R2 0.5943 0.6354 0.6418 0.6529 0.6704 0.6825
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Judgments per 100 individuals. All regressions are weighted by
population and estimated on the common support sample.
Table 3: Judgments and Debt Portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black Majority: ZIP 0.5853∗∗∗ 0.5873∗∗∗ 0.5957∗∗∗ 0.5614∗∗∗ 0.5671∗∗∗
(0.1193) (0.1161) (0.1123) (0.1303) (0.1339)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X
Baseline Controls X X X X X
Debt Levels Yes Yes
Monthly Payment and Utilization Yes Yes
Debt Composition Yes Yes
Delinquency/Bankruptcy/Collections Yes Yes
Observations 2673 2673 2673 2673 2673
R2 0.6812 0.6733 0.6725 0.6745 0.6891
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Judgments per 100 individuals. All regressions are
weighted by population and estimated on the common support sample.
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Table 4: Judgments and Lending Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black Majority: ZIP 0.8265∗∗∗ 0.8248∗∗∗ 0.8263∗∗∗ 0.7108∗∗∗ 0.6965∗∗
(0.2801) (0.2786) (0.2803) (0.2121) (0.2861)
Broadband 0.0930∗∗
(0.0431)
Unscored 0.3830
(0.3923)
Banks (5 miles) -0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0020)
Payday Lenders (5 miles) 0.0219∗∗∗
(0.0032)
Banks (10 miles) -0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Payday Lenders (10 miles) 0.0099∗∗∗
(0.0013)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X
Baseline Controls X X X X X
Observations 1703 1703 1703 1703 1703
R2 0.8463 0.8474 0.8463 0.8597 0.8557
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Judgments per 100 individuals. All
regressions are weighted by population and estimated on the common support sample.
38
Table 5: Attorney Representation and Judgment Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attorney Judgments Consent Contested Default
Black Majority: ZIP -0.013∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.006 0.002 0.010
(0.004) (0.121) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Attorney -0.190 -0.015 0.058 -0.234∗∗∗
(0.691) (0.059) (0.050) (0.057)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X
Baseline Controls X X X X X
Observations 2673 2673 2673 2673 2673
R2 0.667 0.670 0.661 0.431 0.532
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions are weighted by population and
estimated on the common support sample.
Table 6: Judgments by Plaintiff Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Judgments Debt Buyer Major Bank Medical High-Cost Misc.
Black Majority: ZIP 0.582∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.076∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.045) (0.022) (0.040) (0.047) (0.049)
Mean 1.299 .58 .456 .288 .083 .161
Effect Size 44.8 32.5 8.9 26.4 125.7 119.7
County Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Baseline Controls X X X X X X
Observations 2673 2673 2673 2673 2673 2673
R2 0.670 0.699 0.751 0.641 0.614 0.553
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions are weighted by population and estimated on the common support sample.
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Table 8: Judgments and Other Demographic Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share Black: ZIP 2.1829∗∗∗ 1.8677∗∗∗ 1.6103∗∗∗ 1.6150∗∗∗ 1.4976∗∗∗ 1.6356∗∗∗
(0.0574) (0.1594) (0.1687) (0.1021) (0.1551) (0.1052)
Share Asian: ZIP -6.2263∗∗∗ -3.2578∗∗∗ -5.7555∗∗∗ -3.3496∗∗∗ -1.5249 -1.3548
(1.2408) (1.1516) (1.0673) (0.9776) (1.3861) (1.0703)
Share Hispanic: ZIP 1.3408∗∗∗ 0.1660 0.7119∗ 0.1395 -0.0104 0.1370
(0.4118) (0.3155) (0.4169) (0.3216) (0.4319) (0.3732)
Median Income 0.0193 0.0245∗∗ 0.0281∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0122) (0.0129)
Median Credit Score -0.0061 -0.0051 -0.0033
(0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0039)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Baseline Controls X
Income Quintiles X X X
Credit Quintiles X X X
Lagged Baseline Controls X
Observations 2673 2673 2673 2673 2673 2407
R2 0.6521 0.6694 0.6689 0.6769 0.6850 0.6993
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Judgments per 100 individuals. All regressions are weighted by
population and estimated on the common support sample.
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Appendix
A.1 Judgment Data
We obtained our judgment data from Paul Kiel and Annie Waldman at ProPublica. This
data included all debt collection judgments in New Jersey, Missouri, and Cook County
Illinois from 2008 to 2012.30 Both Missouri and New Jersey have state-wide databases.
The Missouri dataset was provided by Missouri’s Office of the State Courts Administrator
(OSCA) and included all debt collection cases filed in Associate Circuit Court for which
OSCA has an electronic record through early 2014.31 For each case in Missouri, the data
contained the following information: court (judicial circuit), county, case ID, filing Date, case
type, disposition, plaintiff, plaintiff attorney, defendant, defendant date of birth, defendant
address, defendant attorney, judgment amount, date of judgment satisfaction, date of first
garnishment attempt.32 Kiel and Waldman added two fields: a standard name for each
plaintiff and a plaintiff type. St. Louis County joined the states online system in 2007 and St.
Louis City has been online since 2000. Missouri’s court system has some variation among the
judicial circuits in how case types are categorized, so, in consultation with OSCA employees,
Keil and Waldman selected a range of case types that could be reasonably construed as debt
collection cases. For St. Louis City and County courts, these were: Breach of Contract,
Promissory Note, Suit on Account, Contract /Account (Bulk), Misc Associate Civil-Other,
Small Claims under $100, Small Claims over $100.33 They limited the dataset to cases that
had resulted in a judgment.
A.2 BISG Algorithm
Vectors of six racial/ethnic probabilities for each listed surname (corrected for suppression
and for low-frequency surnames) are used as the first input into the BISG algorithm. This
information is used to calculate a prior probability of an individual’s race/ethnicity. The
algorithm updates these prior probabilities with geocoded ZCTA proportions for these groups
from the 2010 Census SF1 files to generate posterior probabilities. Let J equal the number
of names on the enhanced surname list plus one to account for names not on the list and let
K equal the number of ZCTA in the 2010 census with any population. We define the prior
30In their ProPublica articles, Paul and Annie focus on Essex County, St. Louis City, St. Louis County,
and Cook County due to the cities high segregation indexes. Due to a peculiarity of the court system
database, the Essex County window is slightly different: July 1, 2007, through June 30, 2012. Futhermore,
various circuits in Missouri came online at different times, but all circuits were online by 2008.
31The max amount sought in associate circuit courts in Missouri is $25K.
32The judgment amount was determined to be unreliable and is not used throughout this analysis.
33Together, the small claims and misc associate cases comprised less than four percent of cases.
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probability of a persons race on the basis of surname, so that for a person with surname j = 1,
..., J on the list, the prior probability for race, i = 1,...,6, is p(i—j) = proportion of all people
with surname j who report being of race i in the enhanced surname file (the probability of a
selected race given surname). This probability is updated on the basis of ZCTA residence.
For ZCTA k = 1,...,K, r(k—i) = proportion of all people in redistributed SF1 file who self
report being race i who reside in ZCTA k (the probability of a selected ZCTA of residence
given race/ethnicity). Let u(i, j, k) = p(i|j) ∗ r(k|i). According to Bayes’ Theorem and
the assumption that the probability of residing in a given ZCTA given a person’s race does
not vary by surname, the updated (posterior) probability of being of race/ethnicity i given
surname j and ZCTA of residence k can be calculated as follows:
q(i|j, k) = u(i, j, k)
u(1, j, k) + u(2, j, k) + u(3, j, k) + u(4, j, k) + u(5, j, k) + u(6, j, k)
(3)
Note that all parameters needed for BISG posterior probabilities are derived only from
Census 2010 data, and that none are derived from administrative sources.
A.3 Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT)
Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT) is an ensemble learning approach that mitigates the ten-
dency of tree-based models’ to overfit to training data. This is accomplished by recursively
combining the forecasts of many over-simplified trees. The theory behind boosting proposes
that a collection of weak learners as an ensemble create a single strong learner with improved
stability over a single complex tree.
At each step m, 1 ≤ m ≤M , of gradient boosting, an estimator, hm, is computed on the
residuals from the previous models predictions. A critical part of gradient boosting method
is regularization by shrinkage as proposed by Friedman [2001]. This consists in modifying
the update rule as follows:
Fm(x) = Fm−1(x) + νγmhm(x), (4)
where hm(x) represents a weak learner of fixed depth, γm is the step length and ν is the
learning rate or shrinkage factor.
The estimation procedure begins with fitting a shallow tree (e.g., with depth L = 1).
Using the prediction residuals from the first tree, you then fit a second tree with the same
shallow depth L. Weight the predictions of the second tree by ν ∈ (0, 1) to prevent the
model from overfitting the residuals, and then aggregate the forecasts of these two trees.
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At each step k, fit a shallow tree to the residuals from the model with k-1 trees, and add
its prediction to the forecast of the ensemble with a shrinkage weight of ν. Do this until
a total of K trees is reached in the ensemble. For our GBT model, we split the data into
three chunks: training set (60%), holdout set (20%), and testing set (20%). We relied on
XGBoost for the implementation of our GBT model (Chen and Guestrin [2016]).
A.4 Expanded Sample
For the interested reader, we relax the common support assumption and replicate Table 1,
Table 2, Table 7, and Table 8 on the entire MO sample. Table A8, Table A9, Table A10, and
Table A11 report the results. We find very similar results to our main specification which
uses only the common support sample, suggesting that omitted variables that are correlated
with observable neighborhood characteristics are not biasing our results in any particular
direction.
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Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure A1: Propensity Score Distributions
Notes: The common support for the propensity score distributions: [0.0013, 0.9750]
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Figure A2: Residual Distributions by Race
Notes: We fit a linear model using our baseline controls and compute corresponding fitted values. We then
obtain and plot the residuals separately for black majority and non-black majority ZIP codes. We test
whether the distribution of black majority ZIP codes is to the right of the non-black majority distribution,
and report the results of the KS-test in the upper right corner.
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Table A1: Judgment Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Judgment Rate Dismissed Settle
Black Majority: ZIP 0.017∗ 0.007 -0.017∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.003)
Median Household Income -0.002 -0.001 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Median Credit Score -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Attorney -0.192∗∗∗ 0.036 0.204∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.067) (0.075)
County Fixed Effects X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Baseline Controls X X X
Observations 2673 2673 2673
R2 0.490 0.737 0.686
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in paren-
theses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions are weighted
by population and estimated on the common support sample.
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Table A2: Judgments and an Alternative Credit Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black Majority: ZIP 1.3307∗∗∗ 0.8139∗∗∗ 0.8310∗∗∗ 0.8139∗∗∗ 0.6317∗∗∗ 0.7410∗∗∗
(0.1444) (0.1383) (0.1317) (0.1383) (0.1511) (0.0519)
Median Household Income -0.0040 -0.0040 0.0029
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0203)
Predicted Probability 1.6121∗∗ 2.3538∗∗∗ 1.6121∗∗ 1.1066∗∗∗
(0.6432) (0.5456) (0.6432) (0.3345)
Median Credit Score -0.0026
(0.0039)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Baseline Controls X
Income Quintiles X X X
Lagged Baseline Controls X
Observations 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 1949
R2 0.6175 0.6821 0.6687 0.6821 0.7090 0.7707
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable: Judgments per 100 individuals. All regressions are
weighted by population and estimated on the common support sample.
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Table A3: Summary Statistics (NJ and IL Sample)
Black White t-test
mean/sd mean/sd b
Judgments 2.81 2.10 -0.70∗∗∗
(2.05) (2.24)
Median Household Income 41.37 51.64 10.26∗∗∗
(15.31) (16.85)
Median Credit Score 605.52 644.63 39.10∗∗∗
(25.99) (39.71)
GINI Index 0.46 0.44 -0.01∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
90+ DPD Debt Balances 7326.86 6330.69 -996.18
(7004.39) (11535.76)
Unemployment Rate 0.12 0.09 -0.03∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
Median House Value (000s) 161.47 201.05 39.58∗∗∗
(65.88) (107.93)
Fraction with Bachelors Degree 0.19 0.25 0.07∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.17)
Fraction without High School Degree 0.18 0.14 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08)
Observations 224 596 820
Notes: Summary statistics for observations on the common support sample.
Data is drawn from NJ & IL.
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Table A4: Judgments, Income, and Credit Scores (NJ and IL Data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black Majority: ZIP 0.8525∗∗∗ 0.6745∗∗∗ 0.6049∗∗∗ 0.6338∗∗∗ 0.4700∗∗∗ 0.4453∗∗∗
(0.1294) (0.1269) (0.1601) (0.1532) (0.1372) (0.1436)
Median Household Income 0.0625∗ 0.0609 0.0331
(0.0370) (0.0397) (0.0372)
Median Credit Score 0.0056 0.0086 0.0066
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0068)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Baseline Controls X X X X X
Lagged Baseline Controls X
Observations 820 820 820 820 820 579
R2 0.9268 0.9406 0.9329 0.9412 0.9472 0.9539
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Observations on the common support sample from NJ and IL; estimated by a
logistic regression, ran separately for each year. Dependent variable: Judgments per 100 individuals.
All regressions are weighted by population and estimated on the common support sample.
Table A5: Summary Statistics (Individual Judgment
Data)
Black White t-test
mean/sd mean/sd b
Judgments 0.14 0.07 -0.07∗∗∗
(0.47) (0.36)
Household Income 60.28 83.75 23.46∗∗∗
(41.12) (57.67)
Credit Score 611.93 683.13 71.20∗∗∗
(107.69) (107.84)
Observations 399723 6722540 7122263
Notes: Summary statistics for observations on the
common support sample. Data is a 1% representa-
tive sample of the U.S. for individuals with a credit
report.
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Table A6: Judgments, Income, and Credit Scores (Individual Judgment Data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Judgments Judgments Judgments Judgments Judgments
Black Majority 0.0689∗∗ 0.0559∗∗∗ 0.0148∗ 0.0158∗ 0.0162∗
(0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Household Income -0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Credit Score -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X
Quarter Fixed Effects X X X X X
Baseline Controls X
Observations 7122263 7122263 7122263 7122263 7105641
R2 0.0026 0.0102 0.0530 0.0541 0.0567
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Observations on the common support sample. Data is a 1%
representative sample of the U.S. for individuals with a credit report. Dependent variable:
current judgments.
Table A7: Judgments and Debt Portfolios (Individual Judgment Data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Judgments Judgments Judgments Judgments Judgments
Black Majority 0.0125∗ 0.0136∗ 0.0157∗ 0.0158∗ 0.0126∗
(0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X
Quarter Fixed Effects X X X X X
Debt Levels Yes Yes
Payment and Utilization Yes Yes
Debt Composition Yes Yes
Delinquency Yes Yes
Observations 7122263 7122263 7122263 712226 7122263
R2 0.0601 0.0580 0.0541 0.0629 0.0691
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 Observations on the common support sample. Data is a 1% representative
sample of the U.S. for individuals with a credit report. Dependent variable: current judgments.
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Table A8: Summary Statistics (Full Sample)
Black White t-test
mean/sd mean/sd b
Panel A: Judgments
...Judgments per 100 People 2.76 1.25 -1.51∗∗∗
(1.33) (0.82)
...Share of Default Judgments 0.45 0.37 -0.08∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.14)
...Share of Consent Judgments 0.16 0.17 0.01
(0.07) (0.12)
...Share of Contested Judgments 0.06 0.05 -0.01∗
(0.04) (0.08)
...Share w/ Attorney 0.04 0.10 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.09)
Panel B: Credit Variables
...Median Credit Score 603.63 680.50 76.86∗∗∗
(37.89) (66.59)
...90+ DPD Debt Balances 3224.61 1430.29 -1794.31∗∗∗
(2632.57) (4275.62)
...Banks (5 miles) 87.91 13.74 -74.17∗∗∗
(39.65) (33.24)
...Payday Lenders (5 miles) 30.74 3.72 -27.01∗∗∗
(9.27) (8.27)
Panel C: Census Data
...Median Household Income (000s) 31.41 45.91 14.50∗∗∗
(11.73) (17.10)
...GINI Index 0.46 0.40 -0.05∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
...Unemployment Rate 0.12 0.05 -0.06∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
...Divorce Rate 0.13 0.12 -0.01∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05)
...Median House Value 86.47 116.08 29.61∗∗∗
(35.28) (67.95)
...Fraction with Bachelors Degree 0.16 0.18 0.01∗
(0.10) (0.13)
...Fraction without High School Degree 0.19 0.15 -0.04∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08)
Observations 248 7865 8113
Notes: Summary statistics for observations for the entire Missouri sample.
52
Table A9: Judgments, Income, and Credit Scores (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black Majority: ZIP 1.5063∗∗∗ 1.0203∗∗∗ 1.0202∗∗∗ 0.8521∗∗∗ 0.7632∗∗∗ 0.8334∗∗∗
(0.1460) (0.1088) (0.1016) (0.0757) (0.1082) (0.0324)
Median Household Income -0.0101 -0.0046 -0.0012
(0.0091) (0.0069) (0.0071)
Median Credit Score -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0003
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020)
County Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Baseline Controls X
Income Quintiles X X X
Credit Quintiles X X X
Lagged Baseline Controls X
Observations 8113 8113 8113 8113 8113 7197
R2 0.5884 0.6545 0.6367 0.6660 0.6761 0.6835
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Observations for the entire Missouri sample. Dependent variable: Judgments
per 100 individuals. All regressions are weighted by population.
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Table A12: Model Comparison
Model RMSE: All RMSE: Black RMSE: White
Linear Model 0.8079 1.2704 0.7809
Non-linear Model 0.6294 0.9556 0.6106
Notes: We split our sample into training and test dataset according
to an 80-20 split. Then, we fit both of our models on the training
dataset, and using the parameter estimates obtained from the train-
ing dataset, we compute fitted values on the test dataset. Then we
compute the residual and obtain the corresponding Root Mean Square
Error (RMSE). We repeat this procedure 10,000 times with distinct
train-test splits and the statistics reported are the averages obtained
from this exercise.
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